Taking Advantage of DNSSEC

Great overview of what’s coming (eventually) to DNS and the internet.

SWITCH Security-Blog

According to measurements by APNIC’s Geoff Hustoncurrently 16 percent of Swiss Internet users use a DNSSEC validating DNS resolver. If you want to benefit from the added security with DNSSEC in your network then I suggest you enable DNSSEC validation in your network as well. SurfNet published a deployment guide recently that takes BIND 9.x, Unbound and Microsoft Windows Server 2012 into account.

Enabling DNSSEC validation on your DNS resolvers is one simple step and it protects you from DNS Cache Poisoning. However, if it were only for this, then the DNSSEC protocol complexity would come at a high cost for only providing this one benefit. In fact, DNSSEC is much more than only a protection from Cache Poisoning. It’s a new PKI in DNS and if you have signed your zone and are already validating then you can take advantage of that PKI. Some use cases are…

View original post 582 more words

How to Test DNSSEC and DANE on a Domain

Here’s a simple way to check if DANE is properly setup on a site:

# echo -n | openssl s_client -connect spdysync.com:443 | sed -ne '/-BEGIN CERTIFICATE-/,/-END CERTIFICATE-/p' | openssl x509 -noout -fingerprint -sha256 | tr -d :
depth=2 /C=IL/O=StartCom Ltd./OU=Secure Digital Certificate Signing/CN=StartCom Certification Authority
verify error:num=19:self signed certificate in certificate chain
verify return:0
DONE
SHA256 Fingerprint=461479314CDEC67FB609C812EB74737BAA5327455AD422BA606C88DD530BF2C2

And then compare that value against published TLSA record:

# dig +short TLSA _443._tcp.spdysync.com
3 0 1 461479314CDEC67FB609C812EB74737BAA5327455AD422BA606C88DD 530BF2C2

These value should match. If they don’t assume the site has been compromised.

This assumes of course the domain is also signed with DNSSEC. A properly configured domain: http://dnssec-debugger.verisignlabs.com/spdysync.com